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In this postmortem, I find that the design, implementation, and maintenance of financial policies during
the period from 1996 through 2006 were primary causes of the financial system’s demise. The evidence
is inconsistent with the view that the collapse of the financial system was caused only by the popping
of the housing bubble and the herding behavior of financiers rushing to create and market increasingly
complex and questionable financial products. Rather, the evidence indicates that regulatory agencies
were aware of the growing fragility of the financial system associated with their policies during the
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1.  Introduction 
Influential policymakers emphasize that the financial crisis was largely precipitated 
by a series of unforeseeable events that conspired to produce a bubble in the housing 
market.  In particular, Ben Bernanke (2009b), Alan Greenspan (2010), Henry Paulson 
(2009), Christina Romer (2009), and Robert Rubin (2010) stress that large capital inflows 
to the United States lowered interest rates, fueled a boom in mortgage lending, a reduction 
in loan standards, and financial innovations that produced an unsustainable explosion of 
credit. This view characterizes the collapse of the financial system as reflecting “accidents,” 
such as the bursting of the housing bubble, and “suicide,” such the herding behavior of 
financiers rushing to create and market increasingly complex and toxic financial products.1
This view, however, is arguably incomplete and could impede the development of 
beneficial financial reforms. While large international capital flows to the United States 
fueled speculative investments in real estate and while financial shenanigans helped 
destabilize the global financial system, a different view holds that policies caused this crisis. 
According to this view, the Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Congress, and other official agencies implemented policies that spurred excessive risk 
taking and the eventual failure of the financial system. Thus, when policymakers highlight 
the global savings glut and “irrational exuberance,” this deflects attention from the 
potential policy determinants of the crisis.  
 
Greenspan (2010), for example, depicts the financial crisis as a once in a “hundred years 
flood” and a “classic euphoric bubble.” From this perspective, policymakers responded to a 
crisis that happened to them. 
                                                 
1 Citigroup’s former CEO, Charles O. Prince, noted to the Financial Times in 2007, “When the music stops … 
things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”   2 
In this autopsy, I assess whether key financial policies during the period from 1996 
through 2006 contributed to the financial system’s collapse. I analyze the decade before the 
cascade of financial institution insolvencies and bailouts and hence before policymakers 
shifted into an “emergency response” mode. Thus, I examine a comparatively calm period 
during which the regulatory authorities could assess the evolving impact of their policies 
and make adjustments. Specifically, I study five important policies: (1) SEC policies toward 
credit rating agencies, (2) Federal Reserve policies that allowed banks to reduce their 
capital cushions through the use of credit default swaps, (3) SEC and Federal Reserve 
policies concerning over-the-counter derivatives, (4) SEC policies toward the consolidated 
supervision of major investment banks, and (5) government policies toward two housing-
finance entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. From this examination, I draw tentative 
conclusions about the determinants of the crisis. 
The evidence indicates that senior policymakers repeatedly designed, implemented, 
and maintained policies that destabilized the global financial system in the decade before 
the crisis. The policies incentivized financial institutions to engage in activities that 
generated enormous short-run profits but dramatically increased long-run fragility. 
Moreover, the evidence suggests that the regulatory agencies were aware of the 
consequences of their policies and yet chose not to modify those policies. On the whole, 
these policy decisions reflect neither a lack of information nor an absence of regulatory 
power.  They represent the selection -- and most importantly the maintenance -- of policies 
that increased financial fragility. The crisis did not just happen to policymakers. 
The evidence does not reject the impact of international capital flows, asset bubbles, 
herd behavior by financiers, or excessively greedy financiers on financial instability, which   3 
have been carefully analyzed by, for example, Acharya and Richardson (2009), 
Jagannathan, Kapoor, and Schaumburg (2009), Kamin and DeMarco (2010), Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2009), and Rose and Spiegel (2009). Rather, this paper documents that financial 
regulations and policies created incentives for excessive risk and the financial regulatory 
apparatus maintained these policies even as information became available about the 
growing fragility of the financial system. 
Although I do not make policy recommendations here, the analyses are relevant for 
those designing reforms (e.g., Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2010, and Levine, 2010). Since 
technical glitches, regulatory gaps, and insufficient regulatory power played only a partial role in 
fostering the crisis, reforms that rectify these conditions represent only a partial and thus 
incomplete step in establishing a stable financial system that promotes growth and expands 
economic opportunities. The entire system of financial regulation -- the system associated with 
evaluating, reforming, and implementing financial policies – played a key role in the crisis.  
It is worth highlighting three limitations with this paper. First, I draw on a wide 
array of insightful examinations of the crisis from newspaper articles, books, regulatory 
agency documents, and research papers. I do not provide new examples or data. A second, 
related, limitation is that I do not conduct a comprehensive examination of all policies 
related to the crisis. In particular, corporate governance, as well as regulatory governance, 
contributed to the crisis. The board of directors of many financial institutions did not 
effectively induce management to act in the best interests of shareholders and others with 
financial claims on the firms as shown by Bebchuk (2010a, b). Rather, in reexamining 
selective pieces of evidence, I show that an enduring breakdown of the financial regulatory 
system was a primary factor in the financial crisis.    4 
Third, financial regulators and policymakers do not share a uniform view of the 
financial crisis.  Officials acknowledge that regulatory mistakes were made. While they tend 
to focus on an absence of regulatory power to cope with failing institutions and regulatory 
gaps in which shadow financial institutions operated with little oversight, there are also 
cases in which the major agencies acknowledge deficient supervisory and regulatory 
practices (e.g., Geithner, 2009). For example, the Federal Reserve noted that it failed to 
monitor Citibank adequately as far back as 2005 and did not correct this shortcoming even 
after Citibank’s financial condition deteriorated in 2008.2
In the remainder of the paper, I discuss how the financial crisis was shaped by 
policies toward credit rating agencies (Section 2), credit default swaps and commercial 
banks (Sections 3 and 4), investment banks (Section 5), and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(Section 6). Section 7 concludes. 
 As other examples, the Inspector 
General of the Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provided 
detailed evidence that regulators failed to implement their own rules to rein in the 
excessively risky behavior of banks. Thus, my characterization of “the” view of 
policymakers could be criticized as an unhelpful caricature. However, my goal is to provide 
a simple, but relevant, summary of the public view of the most senior policymakers as a 
mechanism for framing and motivating my assessment of what went wrong. 
                                                 
2 See (1) “Fed Reviews Find Errors in Oversight of Citigroup,” Sewell Chan and Eric Dash, The New York Times, 
4/8/2010, (2) the Material Loss Reviews by the Office of the Inspector General of the FDIC, which are available at 
http://www.fdicig.gov/, (3) the reports by the Office of the Inspector General of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/, and (4) “U.S. Faults Regulators Over a Bank,”, Sewell 
Chan, The New York Times, 4/12/2010. 
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2.   The Credit Rating Agencies  
“These errors make us look either incompetent at credit analysis or like we 
sold our soul to the devil for revenue, or a little bit of both.” 
 
A Moody’s managing director responding anonymously to an internal 




Credit rating agencies were indispensable to the crisis. To appreciate their role, 
consider the following sequence of transactions underlying the vast misallocation of global 
credit. Mortgage companies routinely provided loans to borrowers with little ability to 
repay those debts because (1) they earned fees for each loan and (2) they could sell those 
loans to investment banks and other financial institutions. Investment banks and other 
financial institutions gobbled-up those mortgages because (1) they earned fees for 
packaging the mortgages into new securities and (2) they could sell those new mortgage 
backed securities (MBSs) to other financial institutions, including banks, insurance 
companies, and pension funds around the world.  These other financial institutions bought 
the MBSs because credit rating agencies said they were safe. By fueling the demand for 
MBS and related securities, credit rating agencies encouraged a broad array of financial 
institutions to make the poor investments that ultimately toppled the global financial 
system. Thus, an informed postmortem of the financial system requires a dissection of why 
financial institutions relied unquestionably on the assessments of credit rating agencies. 
How did they become so pivotal? 
Until the 1970s, credit rating agencies were comparatively insignificant, moribund 
institutions that sold their assessments of credit risk to subscribers. Given the poor 
                                                 
3 From “Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?” by Gretchen Morgenson, New York Times, 12/7/2008.   6 
predictive performance of these agencies, the demand for their services was limited for 
much of the 20th century (Partnoy, 1999). Indeed, academic researchers found that credit 
rating agencies produce little additional information about the firms they rate; rather, their 
ratings lag stock price movements by about 18 months (Pinches and Singleton, 1978). 
 
2.2 The creation of NRSROs 
Credit rating agencies experienced a major change in 1975. The SEC created the 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) designation, which it 
granted to the largest credit rating agencies. The SEC then relied on the NRSRO’s credit risk 
assessment in establishing capital requirements on SEC-regulated financial institutions.  
The creation of -- and reliance on -- NRSROs by the SEC triggered a cascade of 
regulatory decisions that increased the demand for their credit ratings. Bank regulators, 
insurance regulators, federal, state, and local agencies, foundations, endowments, and 
numerous entities around the world all started using NRSRO ratings to establish capital 
adequacy and portfolio guidelines. For example, bank regulators used NRSRO ratings to set 
capital requirements. Federal agencies used the risk designations of the NRSROs to 
establish asset allocation restrictions for several organizations, including government-
sponsored entities like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Furthermore, given the reliance by 
prominent regulatory agencies on NRSRO ratings, private endowments, foundations, and 
mutual funds also used their ratings in setting asset allocation guidelines for their 
investment managers. NRSRO ratings shaped the investment opportunities, capital 
requirements, and hence the profits of insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds, 
and a dizzying array of other financial institutions.    7 
Unsurprisingly, NRSROs shifted from selling their credit ratings to subscribers to 
selling their ratings to the issuers of securities. Since regulators, official agencies, and 
private institutions around the world relied on NRSRO ratings, virtually every issuer of 
securities was compelled to purchase an NRSRO rating if it wanted a large market for its 
securities. 
Indeed, Partnoy (1999) argues that NRSROs essentially sell licenses to issue 
securities; they do not primarily provide assessments of credit risk.4
 
 A firm issuing a 
security without obtaining an NRSRO rating will face a limited market for its securities. Due 
to regulations and legal restrictions, the degree to which financial institutions deem 
particular securities appealing is powerfully shaped by NRSRO ratings. As long as the 
financial regulatory authorities rely on -- and hence endorse -- NRSRO ratings, there will be 
an enormous demand for NRSRO services. 
2.3 Conflicts of interest in credit rating agencies 
There are clear conflicts of interest associated with credit rating agencies selling 
their ratings to the issuers of securities. Issuers have an interest in paying rating agencies 
more for higher ratings since those ratings influence the demand for and hence the pricing 
of securities. And, rating agencies can promote repeat business by providing high ratings. 
Interestingly, the vice president of Moody’s explained in 1957 that, “[W]e obviously cannot 
ask payment for rating a bond. To do so would attach a price to the process, and we could 
not escape the charge, which would undoubtedly come, that our ratings are for sale.”5
                                                 
4 See Hill (2010a, 2010b) for insight examinations of credit-ratings firms. 
 
 
5 From “Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?” by Gretchen Morgenson, New York Times, 12/7/2008.   8 
While recognizing the conflicts of interest, credit rating agencies convinced 
regulators and Congress that reputational capital reduces the pernicious incentive to sell 
better ratings. If a rating agency does not provide sound, objective assessments of a 
security, the agency will experience damage to its reputation with consequential 
ramifications on its long-run profits. Purchasers of securities will reduce their reliance on 
this agency, which will reduce demand for all securities rated by the agency. As a result, 
issuers will reduce their demand for the services provide by that agency, reducing the 
agency’s future profits. From this perspective, reputational capital is vital for the long-run 
profitability of credit rating agencies and will therefore contain any short-run conflicts of 
interest associated with “selling” a superior rating on any particular security. 
Reputational capital will reduce conflicts of interest, however, only under particular 
conditions. First, decision makers at rating agencies must have a sufficiently long-run profit 
horizon, so that the long-run costs to the decision maker from harming the agencies 
reputation outweigh the short-run benefits from selling a bloated rating. Second, the 
demand for securities must respond to poor rating agency performance, so that decision 
makers at rating agencies are punished for issuing bloated ratings on even a few securities. 
These conditions do not hold; indeed, regulations weakened the degree to which a 
decline in the reputation of a credit rating agency reduced demand for its services. First, 
capital regulations induce the vast majority of the buyers of securities to use NRSRO rating 
in selecting assets. These regulations hold regardless of NRSRO performance, which 
moderates the degree to which poor ratings performance reduces the demand for NRSRO 
services. Such regulations mitigate the positive relation between rating agency 
performance and profitability. Second, the feedback from the quality of an NRSRO’s ratings   9 
to its profits has been further weakened by the inability of those using credit ratings to sue 
NRSROs. Rating agencies claim that their ratings are opinions, which are protected by the 
right of free speech. The agencies and executives claim that they bear no responsibility for 
the quality of those ratings.  
 
2.4 Securitization and the intensification of conflicts of interest  
Any remnants of a disciplining effect of reputational capital on the conflicts of 
interest plaguing NRSROs were essentially eliminated by the explosive growth of 
securitized and structured financial products from the late-1990s onward. Securitization 
and structuring involved the packaging and rating of trillions of dollars worth of new 
financial instruments. Huge fees associated with processing these securities flowed to 
banks and NRSROs. Impediments to this securitization and structuring process, such as the 
issuance of low credit rating on the securities, would gum-up the system, reducing rating 
agency profits.  
In fact, the NRSROs started selling ancillary consulting services to facilitate the 
processing of securitized instruments, increasing NRSRO incentives to exaggerate ratings 
on structured products. Besides purchasing ratings from the NRSROs, the banks associated 
with creating structured financial products would first pay the rating agencies for guidance 
on how to package the securities to get high ratings and then pay the rating agencies to rate 
the resultant products. The short-run profits from these activities were mind bogglingly 
large and made the future losses from the inevitable loss of reputational capital irrelevant.    10 
Thus, rating agencies faced little market discipline, had no significant regulatory 
oversight, were protected from competition by regulators, and enjoyed a burgeoning 
market for their services.6
The regulatory community did not adapt to these well-known developments. 
Distressingly, the intensification of conflicts of interest through the selling of consulting 
services by rating agencies closely resembles the amplification of conflicts of interest when 
accounting firms increased their sales of consulting services to the firms they were 
auditing. This facilitated the corporate scandals that emerged less than a decade ago, 
motivating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Yet, still, regulators did not respond as rating 
agencies pursued these increasingly profitable lines of business. 
 It was good to be an NRSRO. 
Given the regulatory-induced protections enjoyed by NRSROs, their behavior and 
profitability were unsurprising. Lowenstein’s (2008) excellent description of the rating of a 
mortgage backed security by Moody’s demonstrates the speed with which complex 
products had to be rated, the poor assumptions on which these ratings were based, and the 
profits generated by rating structured products. Other information indicates that if the 
rating agencies issued a lower rating than Countrywide (a major purchaser of NRSRO 
ratings) wanted, a few phone calls would get this changed.7
                                                 
6 The 2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act specifically prohibited the SEC from regulating an NRSRO’s 
rating methodologies. 
 Indeed, internal e-mails 
indicate that the rating agencies lowered their rating standards to expand business and 
boost revenues. A Standard and Poor’s employee noted in 2004, “We are meeting with your 
group this week to discuss adjusting criteria for rating C.D.O.s of real estate assets this week 
because of the ongoing threat of losing deals. Lose the C.D.O. and lose the base business — a 
7 See “Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?” by Gretchen Morgenson, The New York Times 12/7/2008.   11 
self reinforcing loop.” (Quoted from “Documents Show Internal Qualms at Rating 
Agencies,” Sewell Chan, The New York Times, 4/23/2010).  A collection of documents 
released by the U.S. Senate suggests that NRSROs consciously adjusted their ratings to 
maintain clients and attract new ones.  
The profit margins enjoyed by NRSROs were extraordinary. For example, the 
operating margin at Moody’s between 2000 and 2007 averaged 53 percent. This compares 
to operating margins of 36 and 30 percent at Microsoft and Google, or 17 percent at Exxon. 
It is true that the performance of the rating agencies played a central role in the crisis. But, 
it is also true that the financial regulators established the privileged position of rating 
agencies and protected them from the discipline of the market. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
While the crisis does not have a single cause, the behavior of the credit rating 
agencies is a defining characteristic. It is impossible to imagine the current crisis without 
the activities of the NRSROs. And, it is difficult to imagine the behavior of the NRSROs 
without the regulations that permitted, protected, and encouraged their activities.  
In terms of a postmortem of the financial system, the role of NRSROs is not an 
example of “accidental” death or “suicide.” The conflicts of interest within NRSROs have 
been known for decades and the further perversion of incentives due to securitization was 
predicted over a decade before the crisis. Moreover, regulators had seen the accounting 
debacle of 2001-2002, when corporations paid accounting firms both to structure and then 
to audit financial statements. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 prohibited accounting firms 
from simultaneously performing these activities. So, when banks started paying the   12 
NRSROs both to structure and then to rate securities, the associated conflicts of interest 
were no surprise. Similarly, it is difficult to view the NRSROs as suicidal. The decision 
makers at NRSROs made enormous amounts of money. It was a logical, rational, and legal 
decision. As noted in an internal e-mail by an S&P employee, “Let’s hope we are all wealthy 
and retired by the time this house of cards falters.” (Chan, NYT, 4/23/2010) Rather the 
evidence is most consistent with the view that regulatory policies and Congressional laws 
protected and encouraged the behavior of NRSROs. 
 
3.  Credit default swaps and bank capital 
3.1.  Background 
The standard narrative of the financial crisis emphasizes the role of complex 
derivative contracts, including credit default swaps. According to this view, financiers used 
newly designed financial instruments to boost profits, with the systemic risks of these 
financial innovations largely unknown. When the housing market faltered, triggering a 
devastating reduction in the price of derivative securities, this shocked both markets and 
regulators. But, is this an accurate, complete characterization? Let’s consider just one, 
albeit enormously popular, derivative contract. 
A credit default swap (CDS) is an insurance-like contract written on the 
performance of a security or bundle of securities. For example, purchaser A buys a CDS 
from issuer B on security C. If security C has a predefined “credit related event,” such as 
missing an interest payment, receiving a credit downgrade, or filing for bankruptcy, then 
issuer B pays purchaser A. While having insurance-like qualities, CDSs are not formally 
insurance contracts.  Neither the purchaser nor the issuer of the CDS needs to hold the   13 
underlying security, leading to the frequently used analogy that CDSs are like buying fire 
insurance on your neighbor’s house. Moreover, since CDSs are not insurance contracts, 
they are not regulated as tightly as insurance products. CDSs are financial derivatives that 
are transacted in unregulated, over-the-counter (OTC) markets. 
In principle, banks can use credit default swaps to reduce both their exposure to 
credit risk and the amount of capital held against potential losses. For example, if a bank 
purchases a CDS on a loan, this can reduce its credit risk: if the loan defaults, the 
counterparty to the CDS will compensate the bank for the loss. If the bank’s regulator 
concludes that the counterparty to the CDS will actually pay the bank if the loan defaults, 
then the regulator typically allows the bank to hold less regulatory capital. This regulatory 
decision allows the bank to reallocate capital to higher-expected return, higher-risk assets. 
CDSs grew dramatically from the mid-1990s until the beginning of the financial 
collapse in 2007. In 1994, building on early efforts at Merrill Lynch and Bankers Trust, J.P 
Morgan further developed CDSs and supporting vehicles, so that they could be employed 
on a massive scale. Gillian Tett (2009) entertainingly and insightfully describes the series of 
financial innovations and regulatory decisions that allowed the CDS market to flourish, 
reaching a notional value $62 trillion in 2007 according to Barth et al (2009).  
 
3.2.  The Fed, CDSs, and bank capital 
The explosive growth of CDSs was abetted by the Fed’s 1996 decision permitting 
banks to use CDSs to reduce capital reserves (Tett, 2009, p.49). Regulators treated 
securities guaranteed by a seller of CDSs as having the risk level of the seller – or more 
accurately, the counterparty – of the CDS. For example, a bank purchasing full CDS   14 
protection from American International Group (AIG) on collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) linked to sub-prime loans would have those CDOs treated as AAA securities for 
capital regulatory purposes because AIG had an AAA rating from a Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization, i.e., from a SEC-approved credit rating agency.  
Given the pricing of CDSs and the Fed’s regulatory decision, banks found CDSs 
valuable tools for reducing capital and investing in more lucrative, albeit more risky, assets. 
For example, a bank with a typical portfolio of $10 billion of commercial loans could reduce 
its capital reserves against these assets from about $800 million to under $200 million by 
purchasing CDSs for a small fee (Tett, 2009, p. 64). By 2007, the largest U.S. commercial 
banks had purchased $7.9 trillion in CDS protection (Barth et al., 2009). 
There were, however, serious problems associated with allowing banks to reduce 
their capital via CDSs. Given the active trading of CDSs, it was sometimes difficult to 
indentify the actual counterparty legally responsible for compensating a bank if an 
“insured” security failed.  Furthermore, some bank counterparties developed massive 
exposures to CDS risk. For example, AIG had a notional exposure of about $500 billion to 
CDSs (and related derivatives) in 2007, while having a capital base of about $100 billion to 
cover all its traditional insurance activities as well as its financial derivatives business. The 
growing exposure of AIG and other issuers of CDSs should have – and did -- raise concerns 
about their ability to satisfy their obligations in times of economic stress. 
   15 
3.3.  The Fed maintains its policy despite growing risks 
The Fed was aware of the growing danger to the safety and soundness of the 
banking system from CDSs.8 For instance, Tett (2009, p. 157-163) recounts how Timothy 
Geithner, then President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, became concerned in 2004 
about the lack of information on CDSs and the growing counterparty risk facing banks. 
Barth et al (2009, p. 184-193) demonstrates through the use of internal Fed documents 
that it knew by 2004 of the growing problems associated with subprime mortgage related 
assets, on which many CDSs were written. Indeed, the FBI publicly warned in 2004 of an 
epidemic of fraud in subprime lending. In terms of the sellers of CDSs, detailed accounts by 
Lewis (2009) and McDonald (2009) illustrate the Fed’s awareness by 2006 of AIG’s 
growing fragility and the corresponding exposure of commercial banks to CDS 
counterparty risk.9
                                                 
8 There is a longer history. In 1992, the President of the NY Federal Reserve Bank, Jerry Corrigan, expressed 
grave concerns that derivatives, primarily interest rates swaps, threatened the stability of banks and 
threatened the banks with tighter regulations (Tett, 2009, 17-18). But, Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the 
entire Federal Reserve System, supported the International Swaps and Derivatives Association and 
successfully convinced Congress in 1994 to keep derivatives largely unregulated (Tett, 2009, 39-40). 
 Between 1996 and 2007, accumulating evidence increased concerns 
about capital adequacy.  
 
9 Furthermore, although the demise and government conservatorship of AIG in the September of 2008 is 
sometimes discussed as a complete surprise, it was not a surprise to the Fed or to Time magazine, which ran 
an article on March 17, 2008 titled, “Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis.” The article reported that AIG had 
recently taken an $11 billion write-down on its CDS holdings and that loses on CDS holdings severely 
damaged Swiss Reinsurance Co. and monoline bond insurance companies, including MBIA and AMBAC 
Financial Group Inc. The article noted explicitly that these developments could be devastating for the 
financial institutions that purchased credit protection from these insurers. Yet, on March 16, 2008 on CNN, 
Treasury Secretary Paulson noted that, “I have great, great confidence in our capital markets and in our financial 
institutions. Our financial institutions, banks and investment banks, are strong.” (Quoted from Barth et al., 2009, p. 
1). Why didn’t the Fed prepare for the potential failure of AIG or other major sellers of CDSs in the spring of 
2008? So far, U.S. taxpayers have handed over about $180 billion to AIG. 
   16 
Yet, the Fed did not adjust its policies regarding bank capital and CDSs.10
The Fed’s initial decision in 1996 permitting banks to reduce capital through the 
purchase of CDSs was founded on straightforward economic principles. If the bank’s 
borrowers do not pay their loans, the bank will not suffer a loss because the seller of the 
CDSs will compensate the bank.  Under these premises, the bank could maintain its safety 
with a smaller capital cushion against potential loses on these loans, because the CDS, in 
principle, hedges that risk.  
 This 
response is surprising because ensuring capital adequacy is the mainstay of bank 
regulatory policies for two reasons. First, when capital falls, banks have less of a capital 
cushion to weather potential loses. Second, and perhaps more importantly, when bank 
owners have less of their own money at risk, this encourages bank risk taking.  Thus, 
reducing capital through the purchase of CDSs can have a multiplicative effect on bank 
fragility. 
The key question is why the Fed maintained its capital regulations with respect to 
CDSs as it learned of the growing fragility of the banking system due to the mushrooming 
use of increasingly suspect CDSs. Bank purchases of CDSs boomed immediately after the 
1996 regulatory decision allowing a reduction in bank capital from the purchase of CDSs. 
Why didn’t the Fed respond by demanding greater transparency before granting capital 
relief and conducting its own assessment of the counterparty risks facing the systemically 
important banks under its supervision? Why didn’t the Fed adjust in 2004 as it learned of 
                                                 
10 Timothy Geithner created a taskforce in 2004 headed by Jerry Corrigan (a partner at Goldman Sachs and the 
former President of the NY Federal Reserve), which identified the array of risks posed by CDS to the stability of the 
banking system. Although the taskforce convinced the banks to improve their back office handling of CDS trading, 
the Fed did not attempt to limit reductions in bank capital from the purchase of CDSs. In fact, Alan Greenspan 
(2005) argued that credit default swaps “… have enabled the largest and most sophisticated banks in their 
credit-granting role to divest themselves of much credit risk by passing it to institutions with far less 
leverage.”    17 
the opaque nature of the CDS market and as the FBI warned of the fraudulent practices 
associated with the issuance of the sub-prime mortgages underlying many CDS securities, 
or in 2006 as information became available about the fragility of AIG, or in 2007 when 
hedge funds warned the Fed, the Treasury, and G8 delegates about the growing fragility of 
commercial banks (Tett, 2009, p. 160-3)?  Why didn’t the Fed prohibit banks from reducing 
regulatory capital via CDSs until the Fed had confidence in the financial viability of those 
selling CDSs to banks? The Fed’s decision to maintain its regulatory stance toward CDSs 
was neither a failure of information, nor a shortage of regulatory power.11
 
 It was a choice. 
3.4.   Postmortem 
I am not suggesting that the Fed’s decision to allow banks to reduce their regulatory 
capital through the purchase of CDSs was the major cause of the global financial crisis. It is 
quite difficult to quantify the degree to which this policy increased risk-taking at any 
individual bank or the fragility of the financial system as a whole.   
I am suggesting that the evolution of the CDS market, the fragility of the banks, and 
the Fed’s capital rules illustrate a key feature of the financial crisis that is frequently 
ignored. The problems with CDSs and bank capital were not a surprise in 2008; there was 
ample warning that things were going awry. Senior government policymakers created 
policies that encouraged excessive risk taking by bankers and adhered to those policies 
over many years even as they learned about the ramifications of their policies.  
 
                                                 
11 As argued by Barth et al (2009, p. 184): “… even if the top officials from these regulatory agencies did not 
appreciate or wish to act earlier on the information they had, their subordinates apparently fully understood 
and appreciated the growing magnitude of the problem.” Also, see the Fed’s 2004 Interpretive Letter #998, 
which reiterates the Fed’s capital regulatory policy with respect to CDSs.   18 
4.  Transparency vs. The FED, SEC, and Treasury 
Powerful regulators and policymakers thwarted efforts to make the CDS market 
more transparent. The Fed (under Alan Greenspan), the Treasury (under Robert Rubin and 
then Larry Summers), and the SEC (under Arthur Levitt) squashed attempts by Brooksley 
Born of the Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC) to shed light on the multi-
trillion dollar OTC derivatives market, which included credit default swaps, at the end of 
the 1990s. 
Incidents of fraud, manipulation, and failure in the OTC derivatives market began as 
early as 1994, with the sensational bankruptcy of Orange County and court cases involving 
Gibson Greeting Cards and Proctor and Gamble against Bankers Trust. Numerous 
problems, associated with bankers exploiting unsophisticated school districts and 
municipalities, plagued the market. Further, OTC derivates played a dominant role in the 
dramatic failure of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in the summer of 1998. Indeed, 
no regulatory agency had any warning of LTCM’s demise, or the potential systemic 
implications of its failure, because it traded primarily in this opaque market. 
In 1998, the CFTC issued a “concept release” report calling for greater transparency 
of OTC derivatives. The CFTC sought greater information disclosure, improvements in 
record keeping, and controls on fraud. The CFTC did not call for draconian controls on the 
derivatives market; it called for more transparency. 
The response by the Fed, the Treasury, and the SEC was swift: They stopped the 
CFTC. First, they obtained a six month moratorium on the CFTC’s ability to implement the 
strategies outlined in its concept release. Second, the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets, which consists of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the   19 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Chairman of the SEC, and the 
Chairman of the CFTC, initiated a study of the OTC derivatives market. Finally, they helped 
convince Congress to pass the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which 
exempted the OTC derivates market – and hence the CDS market – from government 
oversight. 
The point of this addendum is to emphasize that senior regulators and policymakers 
lobbied hard to keep CDSs and other derivatives in opaque markets. Thus, a comprehensive 
assessment of the causes of the crisis must evaluate why policymakers made choices like 
this. Indeed, Nick Timiraos and James R. Hagerty argue in The Wall Street Journal on February 
9, 2010,  
“Nearly a year and half after the outbreak of the global economic crisis, many of 
the problems that contributed to it haven’t been tamed. The U.S. has no system in 
place to tackle a failure of its largest financial institutions. Derivatives contracts 
of the kind that crippled American International Group Inc. still trade in the 
shadows. And investors remain heavily reliant on the same credit-ratings firms 
that gave AAA ratings to lousy mortgage securities.” 
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5.  Investment Bank Capital, Risk-Taking, and the SEC 
“We have good deal of comfort about the capital cushions at 
these firms at the moment.”12
 
 
Christopher Cox, chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, March 11, 2008.  
 
5.1.  Total failure 
All five of the major investment banks that had been supervised by the SEC in 2008 
experienced major transformations. Only three days after the SEC Chairman expressed 
confidence in the financial soundness of the investment banks on March 11, 2008, the New 
York Federal Reserve provided an emergency $25 billion loan to Bear Stearns in a vain 
attempt to avert Bear’s failure. A few days later, with additional financial assistance from 
the Fed, a failed Bear Stearns merged with the commercial bank JP Morgan Chase & Co. Six 
months later, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, and a few months later, at the brink of 
insolvency, Merrill Lynch merged with Bank of America. In the autumn of 2008, Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley were “pressured” into becoming bank holding companies by the 
Federal Reserve and arguably rescued from failure through an assortment of public 
programs. The SEC’s fingerprints are indelibly imprinted on this debacle. 
 
5.2.  Three Coordinated SEC Policies 
Consider three interrelated SEC decisions regarding the regulation of investment 
banks. First, the SEC in 2004 exempted the five largest investment banks from the net 
capital rule, which was a 1975 rule for computing minimum capital standards at broker-
                                                 
12 Quoted from the Stephan Labaton, The New York Times, 10/3/2008. 
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dealers.13
Second, in a related, coordinated 2004 policy change, the SEC enacted a rule that 
induced the five investment banks to become “consolidated supervised entities” (CSEs): 
The SEC would oversee the entire financial firm. Specifically, the SEC now had 
responsibility for supervising the holding company, broker-dealer affiliates, and all other 
affiliates on a consolidated basis. These other affiliates include other regulated entities, 
such as foreign-registered broker-dealers and banks, as well as unregulated entities such as 
derivatives dealers (Colby, 2007). The SEC was charged with evaluating the models 
employed by the broker-dealers in computing appropriate capital levels and assessing the 
overall stability of the consolidated investment bank. Given the size and complexity of 
these financial conglomerates, overseeing the CSEs was a systemically important and 
difficult responsibility. 
 The investment banks were permitted to use their own mathematical models of 
asset and portfolio risk to compute appropriate capital levels. The investment banks 
responded by issuing more debt to purchase more risky securities without putting 
commensurately more of their own capital at risk. Leverage ratios soared from their 2004 
levels, as the bank’s models indicated that they had sufficient capital cushions. 
Third, the SEC neutered its ability to conduct consolidated supervision of major 
investment banks. With the elimination of the net capital rule and the added complexity of 
consolidated supervision, the SEC’s head of market regulation, Annette Nazareth, promised 
to hire high-skilled supervisors to assess the riskiness of investment banking activities. But, 
                                                 
13 As the SEC Commissioners debated the policy, they noted that it could lead to a “potential catastrophe” and 
questioned whether “we really will have investor protection.”  Yet, they ultimately voted for it, with one 
commissioner noting that he would “keep my fingers crossed for the future.” For an illuminating video of the actual 
meeting, see “The Day the SEC Changed the Game” at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/business/series/the_reckoning/index.html 
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the SEC didn’t. In fact, the SEC had only seven people to examine the parent companies of 
the investment banks, which controlled over $4 trillion in assets. Under Christopher Cox, 
who became chairman in 2005, the SEC eliminated the risk management office and failed to 
complete a single inspection of a major investment bank in the year and a half before the 
collapse of those banks (Labaton, 2008). Cox also weakened the Enforcement Division’s 
freedom to impose fines on financial firms under its jurisdiction. 
 
5.3.  The effects of these decisions 
The combination of these three policies contributed to the onset, magnitude, and 
breadth of the financial crisis. The SEC’s decisions created enormous latitude and 
incentives for investment banks to increase risk, and they did. The SEC has correctly argued 
that the net capital rule never applied to the holding company in defending the 2004 net 
capital rule. But, this defense is narrowly focuses on the net capital rule alone. It is the 
combination of SEC policies that helped trigger the crisis, not only the change in the net 
capital rule.14
In easing the net capital rule, adopting a system of consolidated supervision, but 
failing to develop the capabilities to supervise large financial conglomerates, many experts 
suggest that the SEC became willfully blind to excessive risk-taking. 
  
Indeed, the current Chairwomen of the SEC, Mary Schapiro, and a court appointed 
investigator make such an assessment. Ms. Schapiro noted: “I think everybody a few years 
                                                 
14 The SEC also correctly notes that leverage ratios at the CSE holding companies were higher during some years in 
the 1990s than in 2006. But, the nature of financial markets and risk-taking shifted markedly from the 1990s to the 
mid-2000s due to the explosion of structured products and the increased use of OTC derivatives. Thus, comparing 
leverage ratios in the 1990s to those in 2006 is much less informative than comparing leverage ratios from 2004 to 
2006, when leverage ratios boomed after the SEC changed its policies. In assessing why the major financial firms 
under the SEC’s purview failed, it is critical to examine the combination of policy responses, not only the net capital 
rule change.    23 
ago got caught up in the idea that the markets are self-correcting and self-disciplined, and 
that the people in Wall Street will do a better job protecting the financial system than the 
regulators would.  I do think the SEC got diverted by that philosophy.” (From “SEC Puts 
Wall St. On Notice,” Edward Wyatt, The New York Times, 4/19/2010). Anton Valukas’s 
2,200-page report on the causes of the Lehman Brothers failure to the bankruptcy court is 
even more pointed. It notes that Lehman "was significantly and persistently in excess of its 
own risk limits." More importantly, he adds that the SEC "was aware of these excesses and 
simply acquiesced."  
To conclude, consider the testimony of The SEC’s Deputy Director, Robert Colby, 
before the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee on April 25, 2007:15
… the bill as introduced would subject the CSEs that already are highly 
regulated under the Commission's consolidated supervision program to an 
additional layer of duplicative and burdensome holding company oversight. The 
bill should be amended to recognize the unique ability of the Commission to 
comprehensively supervise the consolidated groups … Because the Commission 




Eighteen months after the SEC argued that it was successfully supervising the five major 
investment banks, they had either gone bankrupt, failed and merged with other firms, or 
were forced to convert to bank holding companies, with billions of taxpayer dollars spent 
on facilitating these arrangements.  
                                                 
15 See: http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts042507rc.htm 
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6.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
6.1.  Background 
The government took over the two regulated housing-finance giants, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, on September 7, 2008 that together owned or guaranteed almost $7 
trillion worth of mortgages.16
These government-sponsored entities (GSEs) were designed to facilitate housing 
finance. They purchase mortgages from banks and mortgages companies that lend directly 
to homeowners, package the mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), guarantee 
timely payment of interest and principal, and sell the MBSs to investors. Besides this core 
securitization activity, the GSEs also buy and hold mortgages and MBSs. By increasing the 
demand for, and hence the price of, mortgages in the secondary market, the GSEs can 
reduce the interest rates the homebuyers pay on mortgages in the primary market, 
fostering home ownership.  
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are Congressionally-chartered, 
stockholder-owned corporations.  
While facilitating housing is a raison d'être, the GSEs also use their privileged 
positions to earn substantial profits. Specifically, the GSEs borrow cheaply: the debt issued 
by these two financial institutions enjoyed an implicit government guarantee, which was 
made explicit when the government placed them into conservatorship. Thus, the GSEs 
could borrow at low interest rates and buy mortgages with higher interest rates. Over time, 
the GSEs increased the degree to which they bought and held mortgages relative to their 
securitization role, in which they bought, packaged, guaranteed, and sold MBSs. As long as 
                                                 
16 More precisely, the Federal Housing Finance Agency placed into conservatorship both the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).    25 
there were not too many defaults, the GSEs made enormous profits. Indeed, profits were 
limited primarily by the size of the mortgage market and threatened by regulatory 
interventions that might force GSEs to funnel more of their earnings into lowering primary 
mortgage rates, with a concomitant lowering of GSE profits. Fortunately for the GSEs, 
Congress and other policymakers helped expand the mortgage market and kept regulatory 
interventions to a minimum. 
 
6.2.  Policy changes and effects 
Two policies combined to expand the mortgage market for GSEs: the expansion of 
the affordable housing mission of GSEs and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) as 
discussed in Barth et al (2009), Joint Center for Housing Studies (2008), and Wallison and 
Calomiris (2008). Enacted in 1977, the CRA was designed to boost lending to disadvantaged 
areas by prohibiting discrimination.  In the mid-1990s, under the CRA, regulators started 
using quantitative guidelines to induce greater lending to low- and moderate-income (LMI) 
areas and borrowers. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the 
mid-1990s put corresponding pressure on the GSEs to adjust their financing standards to 
facilitate the flow of credit to LMI borrowers, encouraging the GSEs to finance lower quality 
mortgages. Furthermore, Congress also added an affordable housing mission to the GREs. 
In 1991, Fannie Mae announced a $1 trillion affordable housing initiative, and in 1994, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac initiated an additional $2 trillion program for LMI borrowers.  
These policies permitted and encouraged the GSEs to accept lower quality 
mortgages and hence spurred primary market lenders to lend more to more suspect 
borrowers. For example, by 2001, the GSEs were purchasing mortgages that had no down   26 
payment; between 2005 and 2007, they bought approximately $1 trillion of mortgages with 
subprime characteristics; which accounted for about 45% of their mortgage purchases.17
The push into lower quality mortgages created a complex “mutual dependency” 
between Congress and the GSEs, fueling their increasingly risky investments (Wallison and 
Calomiris, 2008). Congress relied on the GSEs to both promote housing policies and to 
provide campaign donations. The GSEs relied on Congress to protect their profitable 
privileges and refrain from regulatory interventions. Each satisfied its side of the bargain. 
The GSEs provided generous campaign contributions and greatly expanded their funding of LMI 
borrowers. Profits and bonuses soared. In turn, policymakers limited regulatory oversight of 
the GSEs. Indeed, even after the House Banking Subcommittee and the GSE’s regulator 
(Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) accused them of serious accounting fraud 
in 2000, 2003, and 2004 and even as evidence emerged of their financial fragility, Congress 
did not pass a proposed bill that would have strengthened supervision of the GSEs and 
prohibited the GSEs from buying and holding MBSs. Such a policy shift would have limited 
GSE exposure to low-quality mortgages, which ultimately led to their bankruptcy.  
 
By signaling to mortgage lenders that they would purchase mortgages with subprime 
characteristics -- such as mortgages with low FICO credit scores, high loan-to-value ratios, 
negative amortization, low documentation -- Fannie and Freddie triggered a massive 
movement into the issuance of lower quality mortgages. Mortgage companies were more 
willing to accept the fees for making loans to questionable borrowers if they knew that the 
GSEs would purchase the loan. 
 
                                                 
17 See the Fannie Mae publication, “2008 Q2 10-Q Summary,” the Freddie Mac publication from August 2008, 
“Freddie Mac Update,” and the calculations by Wallison and Calomiris, 2008, p. 7-8.   27 
6.3.  Postmortem 
Deterioration in the financial condition of the GSEs was not a surprise. The New York 
Times warned in 1999 that Fannie Mae was taking on so much risk that an economic 
downturn could trigger a “rescue similar to that of the savings and loan industry in the 
1980s,” and again emphasized this point in 2003.18 From 2003 through 2007, the GSE’s 
regulator warned of excessive risk-taking; the Treasury acknowledged ineffective oversight 
of the GSEs; Congress discussed the fragility of GSEs and their illusory profits; Alan 
Greenspan testified before the Senate Banking Committee in 2004 that the increasingly 
large and risky GSE portfolios could have enormously adverse ramifications; and Taleb 
(2007) warned that the GSEs “seem to be sitting on a barrel of dynamite, vulnerable to the 
slightest hiccup.”19
But, Congress did not respond and allowed increasingly fragile GSEs to endanger the 
entire financial system. It is difficult to discern why. Some did not want to jeopardize the 
increased provision of affordable housing. Many received generous financial support from 
the GSEs in return for their protection. For the purposes of this paper, the critical issue is 
that policymakers did not respond as the GSEs became systemically fragile. Again, I am not 
arguing that the timing, extent, and full nature of the housing bubble were perfectly known. 
I am arguing that policymakers created incentives for massive risk-taking by the GSEs and 
then did not respond to information that this risk-taking threatened the financial system.  
 
                                                 
18 See Steven A. Holmes, “Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending,” New York Times, September 30, 
1999 and Alex Berenson, “Fannie Mae’s Loss Risk is Larger, Computer Models Show,” New York Times, August 7, 
2003. 
 
19 See Zachary A. Goldfarb, “Affordable-Housing Goals Scaled Back,” Washington Post, September 24, 2008, 
Stephen Labaton, “New Agency Proposed to Oversee Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae,” New York Times, September 
31, 2003, and Alan Greenspan, “Proposals for Improving the Regulation of the Housing Government Sponsored 
Enterprises,” testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, February 24, 
2004.   28 
7.  Conclusion 
Finance is powerful.  As the last few years demonstrate, the malfunctioning of the 
financial system can trigger economic crises, harming the welfare of many. As the last few 
centuries demonstrate, the functioning of the financial system affects long-run economic 
growth. If financial systems funnel society’s savings to those with the best projects, this 
helps promote and sustain economic progress (Levine, 2005). Getting financial policies 
right is a first-order priority in creating an environment conducive to economic prosperity. 
This paper has examined the determinants of the recent crisis. Without denying the 
importance of capital account imbalances and herd behavior, my analyses suggest that this 
is not the entire story. Similarly, while a confluence of surprises helped trigger the crisis, 
the evidence is inconsistent with the view that poor information about financial 
institutions was the sole cause of the crisis. Thus, the evidence is inconsistent with 
testimonies before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Robert Rubin (former 
Treasury secretary and former director of Citigroup), Charles O. Prince III (former CEO of 
Citigroup), and Alan Greenspan (former Chairman of the Fed), who claim that the crisis was 
an unprecedented and unpredictable accident. The crisis did not just happen. Policymakers 
and regulators, along with private sector coconspirators, helped cause it. 
The evidence indicates that financial sector policies during the period from 1996 
through 2006 precipitated the crisis. Either by becoming willfully blind to excessive risk 
taking or by maintaining policies that encouraged destabilizing behaviors, policymakers 
and regulatory agencies contributed to the financial system’s collapse. As noted by Senator 
Carl Levin, “The recent financial crisis was not a natural disaster; it was a manmade 
economic assault. It will happen again unless we change the rules.”   29 
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